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A B S T R A C T
Although phishing is a form of cybercrime that internet users get confronted with rather fre-
quently, many people still get deceived by these practices. Since receiving phishing e-mails is an
important prerequisite of victimization, this study focusses on becoming a phishing target. More
precisely, we use an integrative lifestyle exposure model to study the eﬀects of risky online
routine activities that make a target more likely to come across a motivated oﬀender. Insights of
the lifestyle exposure model are combined with propensity theories in order to determine which
role impulsivity plays in phishing targeting. To achieve these objectives, data collected in 2016
from a representative sample (n=723) were used. Support was found for a relationship between
both online purchasing behavior and digital copying behavior, and phishing targeting. Moreover,
a relationship was found between all online activities (except for online purchasing behavior)
and impulsivity. The present study thus suggests that especially online shoppers and users who
often share and use copied ﬁles online should be trained to deal with phishing attacks appro-
priately.
1. Introduction
In today’s society, the internet has become an integrated part of individuals’ lives. Also cybercriminals found ways to proﬁt from
the internet’s characteristics. Since it is easy to disguise one’s identity online, there are cybercriminals who pose as a trusted entity in
order to deceive unsuspecting internet users into disclosing personal information (e.g., passwords, credit card details), which is called
phishing (Lastdrager, 2014). Although phishing occurs rather frequently, internet users still seem highly susceptible to the deceiving
messages and the fraudulent websites the cybercriminals create. These misjudgments can result in, amongst others, considerable
ﬁnancial losses or identity theft.
In the past few years, phishing victimization has increasingly gained attention as a research topic and several issues surrounding
this subject have been addressed. For instance, previous studies have focused on the process of deception detection in phishing e-
mails by users and by specialized software (Khonji et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2010). Also, the characteristics of phishing victims have
been analyzed (Alseadoon, 2014; Halevi et al., 2015) and anti-phishing training, interventions and other tools have been evaluated
(Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Purkait, 2012; Sheng et al., 2010). The present study adds to the existing literature by focusing on
‘phishing targeting’ (Reyns, 2015), which is an important prerequisite of victimization. Since sending only three phishing e-mails
gives phishers a more than 50% chance of at least one click (Verizon, 2013), it could be argued that people receiving a lot of phishing
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e-mails are at higher risk of becoming a victim. More insight into the topic of targeting is thus required. More particularly, the
characteristics that may inﬂuence internet users’ likelihood of receiving phishing e-mails are in need of further investigation. To
identify dispositional and experiential factors related to phishing targeting, this study will test an integrated model, with key
components derived from the lifestyle exposure model (Hindelang et al., 1978) and the routine activity theory of general deviance
(Osgood et al., 1996). One of the key premises of this framework states that unstructured routine activities such as ‘hanging out on the
street’ are conducive to crime. However, since this framework has hardly been applied in an online context, this study will investigate
the relationship between several unstructured online activities (e.g., downloading and sharing ﬁles, risky online self-disclosure) and
phishing targeting. Moreover, the extended lifestyle exposure model will be combined with the insights from propensity theories,
which stress the importance of impulsivity in predicting risk taking behavior. In sum, this study will integrate important crimin-
ological theoretical frameworks in order to predict phishing targeting.
2. Phishing
The term ‘phishing’ can be deﬁned as “a scalable act of deception whereby impersonation is used to obtain information from a
target” (Lastdrager, 2014, p. 8). Just like ﬁshers, phishers use bait to increase the chances that their target will “bite”. This bait most
frequently consists of e-mails seemingly sent by a trusted entity, for example a bank (Purkait, 2012; Purkait et al., 2014; Reyns,
2015). These e-mails often inform the user that a problem occurred that can only be solved if the e-mail’s recipient conﬁrms some
personal information (Hinde, 2004; Wright and Marett, 2010), or they promise tempting oﬀers in exchange for personal details like a
user ID or password (Hinde, 2004). Usually phishing e-mails do not ask for a direct reply, but contain a link to a fraudulent website,
which is ‘the hook’ in the ﬁshing metaphor. This website is very similar in look and feel to the oﬃcial website it impersonates
(Alseadoon et al., 2012; Hinde, 2004; Purkait et al., 2014; Wright and Marett, 2010). A recent report based on real-world online
security incidents indicates that around 1 in 14 targets get successfully phished, either because they clicked the link or opened an
attachment in a phishing e-mail (Verizon, 2017). Especially young people, between the ages of 18 and 25 seem to be a vulnerable
target group (Sheng et al., 2010). An experimental study among university students shows that after two waves of attacks up to 83%
of the young targets click the link mentioned in a phishing e-mail (Vishwanath, 2015a). Successful phishing attacks often result in
identity theft and subsequently in ﬁnancial gains for the oﬀender. However, Purkait et al. (2014) stress the fact that money is not
always the main objective for phishers. The collected information can also be used to harm the reputation of an individual or
company, for example by spreading some controversial statements on behalf of another person. Besides identity, phishers can also
steal intellectual property (Wright and Marett, 2010) or customer information from businesses (Hong, 2012).
A recent study by Graham and Triplett (2016) indicates that more than 30% of adults has received phishing e-mails in the past.
Within a student population, this percentage even surpasses 50% (Ngo and Paternoster, 2011). It is thus safe to say that receiving
phishing attempts via e-mail is a rather common phenomenon. This might be due to the speciﬁc characteristics of the internet. Wall
(2007, p.70) notes that it is not diﬃcult for a criminal to choose between either planning a million dollar bank robbery or performing
millions of $1 robberies in an online environment with a lot less risk and trouble. To obtain people’s e-mail addresses or complete e-
mail lists, it suﬃces to just carry out a well-aimed Google search (Alazab and Broadhurst, 2015; TrendMicro, 2012). Once digital
contact details are collected, phishers can start spreading mass e-mails to all addresses at once or carry out spear-phishing attacks to
deceive speciﬁc victims with personalized e-mails (Alazab and Broadhurst, 2015; Hong, 2012).
The limited amount of risk related to performing a phishing attack stands in contrast to the serious losses and harm caused by
these practices. Financial Fraud Action UK, for example, claims that between January and June of 2017 alone, a total of 366.4 million
pounds was lost due to ﬁnancial fraud. These losses are closely linked to personal and ﬁnancial details stolen through online attacks
and impersonation scams (i.e., phishing) (FFA UK, 2017). Moreover, recent reports by the Anti-Phishing Work Group (APWG, 2016)
show that the amount of unique phishing sites detected was never higher than in the ﬁrst half of 2016. Although most fraudulent
websites are taken down once their illegitimacy has been conﬁrmed, new ones are created every day (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012). At
the beginning of January 2018, more than 26.000 valid phishing web sites could still be found online and active (Phishtank, 2018).
This proves that phishing is a still pressing problem.
2.1. Characteristics of the phishing message
Given the high amount of people that get victimized by phishers and the losses connected to this kind of online deception,
researchers have tried to gain more insight into the characteristics of phishing e-mails that determine whether or not they will be
successful. Two studies by Jakobsson (2007) indicate that e-mails oﬀering a monetary price or asking for a password are more easily
assessed as “phishy”, while messages only containing information (e.g., about an alleged security update) are more likely to be
perceived as safe. This might pose a problem, as these apparent trustworthy e-mails might just as well contain a link to a phishing
website. Further, mails containing spelling mistakes or unprofessional design tend to raise people’s suspicion (Furnell, 2007;
Jakobsson, 2007). When phishers succeed in convincing the receivers that the mail is authentic, the next step is to persuade the
recipient that sharing personal information is required. Here, social engineering strategies that have proven to be eﬀective are ‘liking’
(i.e., pretending to be a person, organization or company the recipient likes and trusts) (Jagatic et al., 2007; Wright et al., 2014),
‘reciprocity’ (i.e., giving people the impression they have to return a favor), ‘social proof’ (i.e., claiming other people have shared
their personal details as well), ‘scarcity’ (i.e., giving the impression that an opportunity is limited) (Wright et al., 2014) and ‘au-
thority’ (i.e., pretending to be an authority ﬁgure) (Butavicius et al., 2015).
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2.2. Characteristics of the phishing target
Studies on fraud victimization in the past have also tried to gain more insight in the sociodemographic characteristics of victims
(Holtfreter et al., 2008; Sheng et al., 2010; Titus et al., 1995). It soon became clear however, that creating demographic proﬁles for
fraud victims is a complex undertaking (Holtfreter et al., 2008). In addition, this focus oﬀers little insight into why people with
certain demographics are more likely to become victimized and targeted (Pratt et al., 2010). Consequently, dispositional factors have
been taken into account as well when fraud and phishing victims are studied. Research shows that individuals with high trust (Wright
et al., 2010) and high submissiveness (i.e., the tendency to comply when faced with authority) tend to be more susceptible to
phishing e-mails (Alseadoon et al., 2012). Higher susceptibility in turn, positively predicts responding to phishing e-mails (Alseadoon,
2014). Also high conscientiousness (i.e., the tendency to be dependable and hardworking) is claimed to be positively correlated with
phishing victimization (Halevi et al., 2015), while ‘suspicion of humanity’ (i.e., the general idea that people do not have good
intentions) has been linked to a decrease in phishing victimization (Wright and Marett, 2010).
Similarly, victims’ experience with computers and e-mails has been taken into account within phishing research. Several studies
show that individuals with more internet experience (Wright et al., 2010; Wright and Marett, 2010) or technological knowledge
(Downs et al., 2007; Sheng et al., 2010) are less susceptible to phishing. It could be assumed that habitual internet users have more
experience with detecting inconsistencies in e-mails. However, a study by Pattinson et al. (2012) indicates that only for people who
were aware that they participated in an experiment on phishing, familiarity with computers had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on how they
managed phishing e-mails. This might implicate that even experienced internet users need a constant reminder of the risks they face.
They might thus not be better equipped against potential harm at all time. This argument is supported by the reasoning of the
criminological routine activities/lifestyle exposure perspective. This approach, which is based on the early work of Cohen and Felson
(1979) and Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo (1978), claims that speciﬁc online activities are conducive to online victimization
(Reyns et al., 2011). From this point of view, it is argued that avid internet users might in fact have a bigger, instead of a smaller
chance to become a phishing target and/or victim, as it is more likely for frequent internet users to come across an online oﬀender.
The present study builds on this reasoning to gain more insight into the relationship between diﬀerent online routine activities
and phishing targeting. More speciﬁcally, we will examine the link between becoming a phishing target and four diﬀerent types of
risky online exposure, which each stress a diﬀerent aspect of the way in which internet users make themselves more visible and
accessible online to phishers. First, (1) exposure to potentially illegal and/or infected ﬁles is considered, by examining people’s digital
copying behavior. Also, we look at (2) risky disclosure of personal information on the internet in general (i.e., risky online self-
disclosure), and on (3) social network sites (SNS) in particular (i.e., SNS use). Moreover, we take into account users’ (4) ﬁnancial
disclosure by looking at their online purchasing behavior. By taking these four risky routine activities into consideration, the lifestyle
exposure framework can be adequately translated to study risk behavior in an online context and can be tested through a diverse
range of exposure types.
The ideas of the lifestyle exposure approach will be combined with insights from propensity theories, that stress the importance of
individual characteristics such as impulsivity (e.g., Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Lahey et al., 2008; White et al., 1994) in the
explanation of oﬀending. Propensity theories argue that impulsive people self-select in risky routine activities and therefore increase
their likelihood of becoming involved in cybercrime oﬀending. Impulsivity has also been used to explain victimization, and cyber
victimization in particular (Bossler and Holt, 2010; Ngo and Paternoster, 2011). However, studies have shown that there is no direct
relation between (phishing) targeting and impulsivity (Holtfreter et al., 2008; Ngo and Paternoster, 2011). Therefore, by using an
integrated model as shown in Fig. 1, this study will link impulsivity with phishing targeting in a more indirect manner. The theo-
retical frameworks this model builds upon, will be discussed in the remainder of the literature overview below.
3. Theory and hypotheses development
3.1. An integrative lifestyle exposure theory of general deviance and victimization
The framework the present study applies is inspired by the lifestyle exposure model of Hindelang et al. (1978) which has since
been updated, extended and applied to explain individual diﬀerences in both victimization and oﬀending (Miethe and Meier, 1994).
According to the original lifestyle exposure theory of criminal victimization, diﬀerences exist in people’s leisure, vocational and
professional activities, which is due to diﬀerences in their background characteristics (e.g., age, race, income). These characteristics
are linked to diﬀerences in role expectations (i.e., what to expect in life) and structural constraints (i.e., what can be achieved in life).
The variations in the structures individuals are part of, are linked to diﬀerences in lifestyles. In this theoretical model, a (risky)
lifestyle refers to one’s daily routine activities (Pauwels and Hardyns, 2016). The lifestyle exposure model stresses the importance of
lifestyles, since they can be linked to diﬀerences in exposure to environments that are conducive to crime (Meier and Miethe, 1993).
According to (Osgood et al., 1996), especially unstructured activities, or activities “that carry no agenda for how time is to be spent”
(e.g., ‘going to a party’ or ‘hanging out on the street’) conducted with peers in the absence of authority ﬁgures or social control, are
conducive to crime. Performing these unstructured activities or risky behaviors increases the likelihood of encountering oﬀenders,
who hang around in the same settings (Hoeben and Weerman, 2014). Engaging in risky routine activities thus increases the likelihood
of victimization, but at the same time might also lead to situations where individuals become oﬀenders themselves (Meier and
Miethe, 1993; Ngo and Paternoster, 2011; Pauwels and Hardyns, 2016). While this theoretical framework has been empirically
corroborated several times (Hoeben and Weerman, 2014; Osgood et al., 1996; Pauwels and Svensson, 2013), it is surprising to see
that it has hardly been applied in the context of online oﬀending and victimization. Therefore, the present study will take into
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account a diverse range of risky online activities that make internet users more identiﬁable online and examine how these are related
to phishing targeting. We take into account digital copying behavior, risky online self-disclosure, SNS use and online purchasing
behavior.
The characteristics of the internet have made it easy for internet users to make copies of ﬁles and to use and share this content
with other internet users. This behavior is legal when copies of software or multimedia content are made for private use. However,
this is no longer the case when ﬁles are distributed more widely, for example when ﬁles are uploaded or downloaded through peer-to-
peer (p2p) ﬁle sharing networks. These networks were estimated to grow at a rate of 26% in the period between 2011 and 2016
(Cisco, 2012). Moreover, in the ﬁrst three months of 2017 alone, almost 1 in 6 of all internet users in the UK (age 12 or older) had
consumed illegal content online (Intellectual Property Oﬃce, 2017). This type of risky behavior is thus rather common and might
increase the risk of becoming a phishing target. Multiple studies show that involvement in cyber deviance is signiﬁcantly related with
the risk of cyber victimization (Bossler and Holt, 2009; Holt and Bossler, 2008; Ngo and Paternoster, 2011; Reyns et al., 2011; van
Wilsem, 2011). Therefore, it can be assumed that internet users involved in copyright infringement are at higher risk of getting
victimized, because they expose themselves to risky online environments that are also used by other internet users who perform
online deviant behavior. Moreover, it can be argued that even internet users who often legally use, copy and share ﬁles, might be at
higher risk of getting victimized. As they more often open and/or download ﬁles, chances increase that they are confronted with
illegitimate or infected ﬁles that are spread by online oﬀenders. Therefore, we hypothesize (H):
Individuals who often use, copy or share digital ﬁles (i.e.., digital copying behavior) are more likely to become phishing targets
(H1), since this behavior increases exposure in risky online settings.
Not only can it be considered risky to share or use copied ﬁles with other internet users, also sharing personal information with
others in a too generous way might increase someone’s victimization risk. For example, adding strangers as a friend to one’s online
social network proﬁle is signiﬁcantly related with online victimization, as well as providing personal information on a SNS (Henson
et al., 2011; Marcum et al., 2010). The same holds true for having one’s personal information posted online (Reyns, 2015). These
risky forms of online self-disclosure make individuals more visible for cybercriminals and may give phishers more ammunition to
create personalized scams. We therefore expect that:
Risky online self-disclosure is positively related to phishing targeting (H2), because this increases the likelihood of sharing
sensitive information with criminals.
Personal information published on SNS is easily traceable. A study by the Pew Research Center indicates that 20% of SNS users
have a completely public proﬁle (Madden, 2012). These pieces of information might be used to contact targets via e-mail in a more
personalized way, but in addition, potential victims can be reached directly through the social network platforms themselves. On
Facebook for example, 1.5% of the proﬁles is marked as ‘undesirable’, as they send spam, infected links and other unwanted content
to the users of the platform (Cluley, 2012). Once a potential target accepts a friend-request sent by a fake user, the instant messaging
system of the SNS is used to contact the target in order to collect personal details (Vishwanath, 2015b). Visiting and using SNS is thus
not without risk. These platforms can be used by phishers to ﬁnd personal information of potential victims, or to request additional
information from them in a very personal and direct way. This leads us to the following hypothesis:
People who use social network sites more often, have a higher likelihood of getting targeted by phishers (H3) because this online
Fig. 1. Conceptual model of determinants of phishing targeting.
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activity increases presence in settings that make them an easy target.
Another risky routine activity that should be taken into consideration is online purchasing. The internet has become a popular
way to buy and sell products. Today, almost eight out of ten Americans say they make online purchases, and 43% shop online at least
a few times a month (Smith and Anderson, 2016). These new purchasing habits however, serve as an extra opportunity for online
fraudsters (Holtfreter et al., 2008). For example, numerous fraudulent websites sell imitations of brand name articles or overprized
concert tickets (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012), and non-delivery (i.e., victims paying for an article or service but never receiving it) is
one of the most frequently reported online oﬀences according to the 2015 Internet Crime Report (Internet Crime Complaint Center,
2015). It is thus rather easy to come across online fraudsters while online shopping. Even if internet users don’t buy anything, but just
share some personal information via these websites (e.g., to make an account), contact information can be used to approach targets
and to phish for other delicate information. Because it is likely that those who shop online more often also come across fraudulent
retailers more often, we hypothesize that:
Internet users who make online purchases more often, are more likely to become a phishing target (H4), since this online activity
increases exposure to online risky settings.
3.2. Propensity theories and impulsivity
Besides being linked to risky routine activities, there is also evidence that the famous victim-oﬀender overlap is associated with
impulsivity (Schreck et al., 2006). Therefore, the present study will integrate impulsivity into the proposed model (cf. Fig. 1).
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) pioneered criminological research into impulsivity, criminal involvement and victimization. Their
general theory of crime in its original form stated that an important factor in explaining criminal behavior is low self-control. When
individuals have a lack of self-control, they are impulsive, not able to contain oneself and less inclined to consider the consequences
of their behavior. Empirical tests of self-control theory have since demonstrated that impulsivity and thrill-seeking are the most
important dimensions that are linked to oﬀending and deviant behavior (Pratt and Cullen, 2000; Vazsonyi et al., 2017). Although the
theory was originally developed to explain oﬀending, it has been suggested that it has the potential to serve as a predictor for criminal
victimization as well (Bossler and Holt, 2010; Ngo and Paternoster, 2011; Schreck et al., 2006). However, most studies are restricted
to oﬄine and traditional types of deviant behavior.
Given this clear link between impulsivity and imprudent behavior in an oﬄine context (Forde and Kennedy, 1997), it can be
assumed that impulsivity is also linked with the performance of online risk behaviors. For example, studies show that a lack of self-
control is related to a variety of copying behaviors, such as movie piracy (Higgins et al., 2007), illegally uploading (Donner et al.,
2014) and downloading ﬁles (Donner et al., 2014; LaRose et al., 2005). Therefore, we expect that there is a relationship between
digital copying behavior and impulsivity. Furthermore, it can be assumed that there is an association between the use of SNS and
impulsiveness. Those who use social media excessively, tend to have problems with spending their time eﬀectively or to plan ahead.
These are characteristics they share with impulsive individuals (Savcı et al., 2016). That’s probably why individuals with high
impulsive tendencies use SNS more often (Wu et al., 2013). Given the link between SNS and online self-disclosure, we expect that also
a relationship exists between impulsivity and risky online self-disclosure. Furthermore, research has demonstrated that impulsivity is
associated with the decision-making process of consumers, both oﬄine and online (Huang and Kuo, 2012). Consequently, online
buying impulsiveness has been scrutinized several times (Chen and Lee, 2015; Huang and Kuo, 2012; LaRose and Eastin, 2002).
Although these studies focus on when and how impulsive purchasing occurs, it is to be expected that a relationship between im-
pulsivity and online purchasing behavior exists. Therefore, we expect:
Impulsivity is positively associated with digital copying behavior (H5a), risky online self-disclosure (H5b), SNS use (H5c) and
online purchasing behavior (H5d).
In sum, this study will examine to which extent several unstructured routine activities explain getting targeted by phishers. These
online activities in turn are expected to be inﬂuenced by internet users’ level of impulsivity.
4. Methodology
4.1. Participants and data collection
This study draws upon data from the interuniversity Social Capital in Neighborhoods (SCAN) project in which 819 respondents
living in 41 neighborhoods of Ghent (Flanders, Belgium) participated. The SCAN is a yearly administered questionnaire that is part of
an interuniversity cooperation between the University of Antwerp (MIOS, department of Communication Studies) and Ghent
University (department of Criminology). During home visits in October and November 2016, face-to-face interviews were conducted
using a structured questionnaire on online and oﬄine social capital, health and risk behaviors.
The sampling design is based on a design applied by Hardyns, Vyncke, Pauwels and Willems (2015). A sample of inhabitants from
each neighborhood was selected based on the municipal registry of 2012. This sample was representative of the composition of each
neighborhood and stratiﬁed by sex (male versus female), age (18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, 65–74, 75+) and nationality
(Belgian versus non-Belgian). Moreover, for every inhabitant in the sample, three substitutes with the same sex, age and nationality
were randomly selected. The backup respondents could be contacted after three unsuccessful home visits to the selected inhabitant,
after a refusal to participate from the selected respondent or when the respondent did not meet the inclusion criteria (i.e., minimal
age of 18, suﬃcient knowledge of the Dutch language and not residing in an institutional setting). When the interviewers ran out of
substitutes, random inhabitants living in the same neighborhood were contacted. This happened in 29.4% (n=241) of the cases. This
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rather high rate might be linked to the partial mismatch that existed between the data from the municipal registry of 2012 and the
situation in the year 2016.
Of all respondents, 88.3% (n=723) indicated they use the internet to look up information and/or to purchase goods or services.
Given the focus of our study, those who did not use the internet for either of those purposes were left out of further analysis as it can
be assumed that these respondents do not use the internet for other activities either. Of the remaining 723 participants, 48.0% male
and 52.0% female respondents between the age of 18 and 92 (M=48.20; SD=16.71) were interviewed. The majority of the
respondents (62.66% or n=443) has a university or college degree, 28.43% (n= 201) graduated from high school, 5.95% (n= 42)
completed the ﬁrst three years of high school and the remaining 2.97% (n=21) went to primary school or is not educated.
4.2. Measures
Note that the exact formulation of all items used to measure the following variables can be found in table 1.
4.2.1. Impulsivity
To measure impulsivity, items from the self-control scale developed by Grasmick et al. (1993) were used. This scale consists of ﬁve
items that measure impulsivity (e.g., “If I can have fun I will, even though I will be in trouble later on”). Each item was scored on a
ﬁve-point Likert scale ranging from totally disagree (=1) to totally agree (=5). Reliability analysis showed that the impulsivity scale
was reliable (α=0.76).
4.2.2. Digital copying behavior
To operationalize digital copying behavior, two items based on a measure of online copyright infringement were used (Bossler
and Holt, 2010), which were then made broader applicable to all users who ever used, copied or shared (1) copies of oﬃcial software
and/or (2) copies of media ﬁles (e.g., music, ﬁlms, games). Both items were measured using a 5-point scale ranging from never (=1)
to very often (=5). The internal reliability proved to be good (α=0.85).
4.2.3. Risky online self-disclosure
This concept was measured using two of the original ﬁve items used by Livingstone, Haddon, Görzig and Ólafsson (2011) to
measure children’s actions in relation to online contacts. Respondents were asked to indicate to which extent risky forms of online
self-disclose (e.g., “I have sent personal information to someone that I have never met face-to-face”) were performed in the last six
months on a 5-point scale (never (=1) to very often (=5)). Reliability analysis indicated the scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.48,
which is rather low. However, this is not uncommon, because the Cronbach’s alpha almost every time underestimates the true
reliability of two-item scales (Eisinga et al., 2013).
4.2.4. Social network site use
A single item was used to measure the frequency of SNS use. Nine answering options (never (=1), monthly (=2), weekly (=3),
several days a week (=4), once every day (=5), 2–3 times a day (=6), 4–5 times a day (=7), 6–7 times a day (=8) and more than
seven times a day (=9)) were oﬀered to indicate how often one generally visits SNS. People without a proﬁle on SNS (n=212 or
29.3%), were not asked to answer this question.
Table 1
Descriptives of the variables included in the study (n=723).
M SD
Impulsivity (α = 0.76)
Item 1 – I often do things without thinking it through. 2.32 0.98
Item 2 – If I can have fun, I will, even though I will be in trouble later on. 2.35 0.97
Item 3 – Sometimes I take risks for fun. 2.19 1.03
Item 4 – I speak my mind, even when that’s not a smart thing to do. 2.69 1.10
Item 5 – I often just do what I feel like doing immediately 2.61 1.02
Digital copying behavior (α = 0.85)
Item 1 – I have copied, shared or used a copy of oﬃcial computer software. 1.95 1.13
Item 2 – I have copied, shared or used a copy of music ﬁles, movies or games 2.28 1.26
Risky online self-disclosure (α = 0.48)
Item 1 – I have added people to my contacts on social network sites (e.g., Facebook) whom I’ve never met in person before. 1.46 0.85
Item 2 – I have sent my contact information (e.g., my full name, address or telephone number) to someone I’ve never met in person before 1.33 0.68
SNS use 4.47 2.34
Online purchasing behavior 1.15 1.25
Phishing targeting 2.03 1.17
Age 48.20 16.71
General internet use 4.82 2.01
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4.2.5. Online purchasing behavior
Respondents were asked to indicate how often they use the internet to purchase goods or services. Again, nine answering ca-
tegories were available (never (=1) to more than seven times a day (=9)).
4.2.6. Phishing targeting
Our outcome variable phishing targeting was measured by a single question from a study of Reyns (2015). Respondents were
asked to which extent they ever were tempted by fraudulent e-mails and/or websites into sharing bank account details, passwords or
other personal information with the oﬀender. To ensure an unambiguous understanding of the question, the respondents were
additionally informed that these e-mails and websites are usually sent by someone posing as a trustworthy organization, such as one’s
bank or employer. A ﬁve-point Likert scale was used, anchored by never (=1) and very often (=5).
4.2.7. Control variables
Sex (male (=0) and female (=1)), age, educational attainment and general internet use were included in our model as covariates.
The age of the respondents was measured using seven age categories, namely 18–24 (=1), 25–34 (=2), 35–44 (=3), 45–54 (=4),
55–64 (=5), 65–74 (=6), 75+ (=7). To measure the highest educational attainment, respondents were oﬀered four options: no
education/primary school (=1); ﬁrst three years of high school (=2); high school (six or seven years) (=3) and higher education (=4). To
assess how much time the respondents spend online in general, a single item was used to measure how often they use the internet to
look something up or to look for information, as the internet is in the ﬁrst place a gateway to information. Nine answering categories
were oﬀered (never (=1) to more than seven times a day (=9)).
4.3. Data analysis
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to examine the hypothesized relationships between the components of our model.
By means of Mplus 7.4. (Muthén and Muthén, 2012), ﬁrst a measurement model was built to verify whether the observed variables
were a reliable measure of the latent variables. Then, the structural model was tested with impulsivity as independent variable,
digital copying behavior, risky online self-disclosure, SNS use and online purchasing behavior as endogenous variables, phishing
targeting as our outcome variable and age, sex, educational level and frequency of internet use as covariates.
The ﬁt of the model was estimated through multiple goodness-of-ﬁt indices. Because the chi-square test is sensitive to sample size,
its value is almost always signiﬁcant (Byrne, 2012). Therefore, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA) and Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR) were taken into account as well. CFI ranges from 0
to 1.00. The closer to 1, the better the model ﬁts. As a rule of thumb, 0.90 is often used as a cut-oﬀ value (Hu and Bentler, 1999). The
value of RMSEA should be kept as low as possible with values below 0.08 representing a good ﬁt and values up to 0.10 indicating a
mediocre ﬁt (Byrne, 2012). The SRMR ranges from 0 to 1, with values close to 0 indicating a good-ﬁtting model (Byrne, 2012). More
speciﬁcally, a good model ﬁt is indicated when the SRMR is smaller than 0.08 (Hu and Bentler, 1999).
5. Results
5.1. Preliminary analyses
Our preliminary analyses showed that of all internet users in our sample, 51.3% (n=371) have been the target of phishing
attacks in the past, although 19.4% (n=140) claimed they get targeted ‘seldom’. Another 19.4% (n=140) of people indicated they
‘sometimes’ receive phishing messages. The remaining 12.6% (n=91) gets targeted often or very often. Other descriptive results can
be found in Table 1.
The correlations among the constructs of our research model are shown in table 2. A signiﬁcant positive correlation was found
between impulsivity and the risky routine activities (p < .01; except for the correlation between impulsivity and online purchasing:
p < .05). Also, the correlations between the online activities and phishing targeting were signiﬁcant and positive (p < .01).
5.2. Measurement model
First, we assessed the measurement model, with impulsivity, digital copying behavior and risky online self-disclosure as latent
Table 2
Correlations between the components of the research model. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (n=723).
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Impulsivity –
2 Digital copying behavior 0.232*** –
3 Risky online self-disclosure 0.228*** 0.332*** –
4 SNS use 0.325*** 0.307*** 0.227*** – –
5 Online purchasing behavior 0.093* 0.257*** 0.164*** 0.211*** –
6 Phishing targeting 0.017 0.230*** 0.154*** 0.189*** 0.134** –
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constructs. The measurement model indicated a good ﬁt with the data: χ2 (24): 111.279 (p < .001), CFI= 0.946, RMSEA=0.072
(CI: 0.059 – 0.086), SRMR=0.048. All factor loadings were signiﬁcant and above 0.52 (standardized values).
5.3. Structural model
Subsequently, we determined whether age, gender, educational level and general internet use should be included as covariates in
the analyses. The analysis revealed a number of signiﬁcant associations among the variables considered. Educational level and gender
were signiﬁcantly related to digital copying behavior (respectively β=0.20, p < .001; β=−0.19, p < .001). Moreover, a sig-
niﬁcant association was found between educational level and impulsivity (β=−0.16, p < .01) and between gender and the use of
SNS (β=0.11, p < .01). Therefore, these sociodemographic variables were included as covariates in the analyses. Note that the
demographics were not regressed on the outcome variable phishing targeting, as we presume that sociodemographic factors are
mostly unknown and of little importance to phishers. Moreover, signiﬁcant relationships were found between general internet use
and digital copying behavior (β=0.33, p < .001), risky online self-disclosure (β=0.32, p < .001), SNS use (β=0.41, p < .001)
and online purchasing behavior (β=0.32, p < .001). Therefore, general internet use was also included as a covariate to the ana-
lyses.
The model ﬁt indices proved that the structural model had an acceptable ﬁt with the data: χ2 (76)= 249.106 (p < .001),
CFI= 0.891 and RMSEA=0.068 (CI: 0.058–0.077), SRMR=0.060. The analyses showed that the online activities online pur-
chasing behavior (β=0.12, p < .01) (H4) and digital copying behavior (β=0.16, p < .01) (H1) were signiﬁcant and positive
predictors of becoming a phishing target. Contrary to our expectations, risky online self-disclosure (β=0.11, p= .131) (H2) and the
use of SNS (β=0.02, p= .761) (H3) were not signiﬁcantly related to the outcome variable. The hypotheses regarding the relation
between impulsivity and the online routines on the other hand, were conﬁrmed (H5a to H5c), except for the relation between
impulsivity and online purchasing behavior, which was insigniﬁcant (β=0.09, p= .054) (H5d). A detailed overview of all estimates
can be found in Fig. 2.
6. Discussion and conclusion
Phishers use the internet to create fake e-mail accounts and messages, in order to persuade their targets to disclose sensitive
information. To prevent that people fall prey to such cons, a ﬁrst step is to gain more insight into which speciﬁc internet users are
more likely to become a target. With our integrated lifestyle exposure framework in mind, we hypothesized that risky online activities
increase the likelihood that internet users come across phishers. More speciﬁcally, the relations between becoming a phishing target
and four types of online exposure, namely digital copying behavior (H1), risky online self-disclosure (H2), SNS use (H3) and online
purchasing behavior (H4), were examined. Moreover, the present study linked the insights from the extended lifestyle exposure
model with those from propensity theories in order to investigate the relationship between impulsivity and the unstructured routine
activities included in the study (H5).
First of all, our ﬁndings suggest that online purchasing behavior is related to phishing targeting. This result might imply that
Fig. 2. Full model of determinants of phishing. Note: All reported coeﬃcients are standardized values, adjusted for the inﬂuence of covariates. The dashed lines
indicate non-signiﬁcant paths. **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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interacting with online retailers is not always a safe undertaking and exposes the internet user to some risk. Not only it is often
unclear how businesses save and share the collected personal information, consumers should also be mindful of the fact that not every
online retailer can be trusted. The link between online purchasing and phishing targeting however, should not be seen as an argument
against online purchasing behavior, but rather as a warning sign for internet users who often buy products and/or services online.
Especially these people should be actively trained in detecting phishing e-mails and phishing websites, as academics and other
specialists in the ﬁeld agree that security training is one of the most important countermeasures to tackle phishing (Jansson and von
Solms, 2013). Easy accessible tools to train internet users already exist, such as the online game Phishing Phil, that teaches users to
discern phishing URL’s from legitimate ones (Sheng et al., 2007). It can be questioned however, if internet users spontaneously come
into contact with such games during their daily online activities. Therefore, context-speciﬁc training, as suggested by Kirlappos and
Sasse (2012), might be a better alternative. In the case of online shopping, context-speciﬁc training would imply that online retailers
try to train their customers whenever they visit their website or purchase a product. For example, customers could be asked before
paying to take part in a little quiz that checks if they can distinguish a phishing e-mail from a real e-mail sent by the retailer. By
making their clients aware of the fact the diﬀerence is in the details, online retailers would contribute to an online environment
where less of their own customers fall prey to phishers.
Second, our study suggests that a relationship exists between digital copying behavior and phishing targeting. Since a con-
siderable amount of internet users are involved in copyright infringement (Intellectual Property Oﬃce, 2017), it might not surprise
that these individuals are more visible and accessible to cybercriminals within online risky environments, such as p2p platforms.
Given that previous studies have indicated that online oﬀending and cyber victimization are closely related (Bossler and Holt, 2009;
Ngo and Paternoster, 2011; Reyns et al., 2011; van Wilsem, 2011), it could be useful to raise the awareness of people involved in such
practices about the more vulnerable position they put themselves in. However, it would be even more eﬀective to discourage
copyright infringement altogether. At the same time, it should be stressed that not all digital copying behavior is illegal. Still, our
results suggest that copying, sharing and using copies of software and/or digital content increases one’s risk of becoming a phishing
target. Also internet users often performing this type of online behavior in a legal way could thus beneﬁt from increased awareness
and following training. In addition, governments should also urge internet users to report the phishing attacks they experience. This is
considered a key element in reducing the eﬀectiveness of phishing (Verizon, 2017). For instance, setting up an online channel to
report suspicious websites and e-mails anonymously would lower the threshold for users who are involved in copyright infringement
to report these criminal practices (Europol, 2016).
Furthermore, this study indicates that it could be useful to apply the integrated lifestyle exposure model in an online context.
Although this study only explains a limited amount of the variance in phishing targeting, the results can still be interpreted as a
conﬁrmation of the link between risky daily routines and victimization in an online context. In addition, it is shown that there is a
signiﬁcant relationship between impulsivity and the online activities examined. This is an interesting contribution to the literature in
this ﬁeld, since it was up to now assumed that individual characteristics like impulsivity were not related to cyber victimization in
situations where not a speciﬁc person, but any person and their computer could become the target of the online crime (e.g., in the
case of phishing) (Bossler and Holt, 2010; Ngo and Paternoster, 2011). This study proves however, that impulsivity might be in fact
related to phishing targeting, although in a more indirect way.
At the same time, it should be mentioned that the hypotheses presuming that SNS use and risky online self-disclosure would be
predictive of phishing targeting, could not be conﬁrmed in this study. A possible explanation for the lack of a signiﬁcant relationship
between SNS use and becoming a phishing target, might be that only the frequency of visiting SNS was taken into consideration.
Perhaps phishing targeting has more to do with the privacy settings used and the speciﬁc amount of personal information shared on
SNS platforms. Depending on how one’s settings are managed, exposure to motivated oﬀender might diﬀer. In the current study, the
cautiousness by which internet users handle their personal details online in general was estimated by measuring risky online self-
disclosure. However, again no signiﬁcant relation with phishing targeting was found. This result could indicate that phishers prefer
using large e-mail lists, for example found by hacking into databases of online retailers, rather than searching for individuals’
personal information on SNS or other websites. Therefore using SNS or being careless with personal information online might not be
strongly related to phishing targeting.
7. Limitations
There is ample room left for the optimization of the proposed model, since only a limited amount of risky activities were con-
sidered and only a small part of the variance in phishing targeting was explained (7.2%). The present study can serve as an en-
couragement to further expand our understanding of phishing targeting. Although we considered a diverse range of risky forms of
online exposure, the four activities oﬀer by no means a complete overview of all the risky online activities that could be linked to
phishing targeting. Given that the data used for this study were part of the broader SCAN project, a limited amount of items and
variables could be listed in the survey. It might thus be interesting for future research to include a broader range of potentially risky
online activities (e.g., hacking, online banking, online gambling). In addition, another limitation is that we did not consider internet
users’ online skills, such as digital literacy, although some studies have provided evidence that these skills could serve as a form of
personal guardianship that can protect internet users against phishing (Graham and Triplett, 2016). It might be interesting for future
research to include digital literacy, as well as other online behaviors (e.g., frequency of e-mail use), online protective behaviors (e.g.,
privacy settings on SNS, the use of anti-virus software) and dispositional factors (e.g., morality). Moreover, the operationalization of
some of the study variables could have been more elaborated (e.g., the scales measuring risky online self-disclosure and digital
copying behavior only consisted of two items). The respondents who enrolled in this project were all aged 18 and older. In future
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waves of the project the online activities of minors (aged 16–18) will also be taken into account, since deviant behavior peeks during
adolescence (Moﬃtt, 1993). Finally, it is important to mention that this study focused on targeting or attempt to victimize, which is
not the same as actual victimization. Since the people who get targeted by phishers more often are not necessarily the same people
who get victimized, it might be interesting for future research to take both phishing targeting and victimization into account, as
Graham and Triplett (2016) did with relation to media literacy. Comparing the activities that predict targeting with those related to
victimization, and how impulsivity plays a role in this, would result in a more detailed overview of the phishing process.
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